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This paper studies the performance of a methodology that can be used to evaluate the impact of new policies
that radically depart from existing ones.  It uses data gathered from a randomized schooling subsidy experiment
in Mexico (i) to estimate and validate a dynamic behavioral model of parental decisions about fertility and child
schooling, (ii) to forecast long-term program impacts that extend beyond the life of the experiment, and (iii) to
assess the impact of a variety of counterfactual policies. The behavioral model is estimated using data on
families in the randomized-out control group and in the treatment group prior to the experiment, both of which
did not receive any subsidy. Child wages provide a valuable source of variation in the data for identifying
subsidy effects. Using the estimated model, we predict the effects of school subsidies according to the schedule
that was implemented under the Mexican PROGRESA program. We compare the predicted impacts to the
experimental benchmarks and find that the model’s predictions track the experimental results closely. The
model is also used to simulate the effects of counterfactual programs and to find an alternative subsidy schedule
that provides greater impact on schooling achievement at similar cost to the existing program.For a recent discussion, see Heckman (2000).
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Non-structural estimation can be used to evaluate new policies either when the policy directly varies
2
itself, e.g., in the case of extrapolating the effect of say doubling the U.S. minimum wage, or when there
is policy relevant variation, e.g., extrapolating the effect of a college tuition subsidy that pays people to
attend college using existing variation in tuition costs (as in Ichimura and Taber (2002)).





The value of empirically determining the underlying structure of economic relations in evaluating the
impact of policy interventions that radically depart from past experience is well understood (Marshak, 1953)
and, in principle, non-controversial.   However, the credibility of applications of structural estimation in
1
forecasting the impact of new policies is often a matter of dispute. Structural estimation requires extra-theoretic
assumptions. Within sample validation is imperfect, because pre-testing of the model’s structure on the
estimation sample is a common practice. Nonstructural estimation, when it can be used for the same purpose,
suffers from the same limitations. Parametric assumptions are required for extrapolating outside the range of
existing policy variation and specification pre-testing is also widespread.   An alternative to using observational
2
data to evaluate the impact of new policies is to design and implement randomized social experiments.  A major
limitation of the experimental approach is that it is usually infeasible to vary treatments in a way that permits
evaluation of many different policies of interest.  In this paper, we demonstrate that there is an unexploited
synergy between social experimentation and observational methods.
This paper has two goals. The first is to assess the validity of a dynamic behavioral model of parental
decision-making about fertility and children’s schooling by exploiting household data from a controlled social
experiment.  The model we develop and estimate is an extension of the static quality-quantity fertility model of
3
Willis(1973) and Becker and Lewis (1973) to a dynamic setting under uncertainty that combines features of
dynamic models of fertility as in Wolpin (1984) and Hotz and Miller (1993) and models of intra-household  For recent surveys if these literatures see Behrman (1997) and Hotz, Klerman and Willis (1997). 
1
2
allocation of resources to children as in Becker and Tomes (1976) and Behrman, Pollak and Taubman (1986).  
4
The social experiment is designed to augment completed schooling levels of children in rural Mexico by
providing subsidies to parents conditional on school attendance. The validity of the model is assessed according
to how well structural estimates of the model, based on data from the randomized-out control group and from
the treatment group prior to the intervention, predict the experimental impact of the program. 
The second goal of this paper is to use the structural estimates of the behavioral model to perform an
evaluation of policy interventions that are not part of the original experimental design, such as variations in the
subsidy, and to assess the longer- term impact of the program on behaviors related to child schooling decisions
that extend beyond the life of the program, such as completed family size and completed schooling of all
children ever born.
It is well known that the structural estimation of dynamic behavioral models requires auxiliary
assumptions about the functional forms of structural relationships, i.e., preferences, technology and other
constraints, and the distributions of unobservable random elements. Assessing the validity of such models by
relying on tests of model fit to sample elements of the data used in estimation provides useful, but usually not
compelling, evidence on the validity of the model. Such models are often subjected to a form of “pre-test”
estimation in that the final formulation of the model is based on the fit of prior formulations to specific
summary statistics of the data. This practice reduces the value of within-sample fit tests as a method of model
validation.
To mitigate the effect of pre-test estimation, there have been a number of attempts to assess model
validity through out-of-sample forecasts. However, such applications are sparse and have been limited by the
nature of the data. For example, Keane and Wolpin (1997) used the estimates of their model of occupational
choice, based on a cohort of young men from the NLSY79 between the ages of 16 and 26 (over the years 1978
to1988), to forecast occupational choices for the same and nearby cohorts between the ages of 27 and 44 over Keane and Wolpin found that the structurally estimated model forecasts white-collar employment better
5
than a non-structurally estimated model, but that the situation is reversed in forecasting blue-collar
employment. They also found that a model in which individuals behave myopically provided incredible
out-of-sample forecasts of occupational choices and wages.
 Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise (1992) found that the structural dynamic programming model forecasts the
6
impact of the window plan better than a non-structural probit specification.
In parallel work, Lise, Seitz and Smith (2003) use data from the experimental evaluation of Canada’s
7
Self Sufficiency Project to test a calibrated equilibrium model of job search behavior.
 PROGRESA stands for Programa de Educacion, Salud, y Alimentacion (Program of Education, Health
8
and Nutrition).  The name of the program was recently changed to Oportunidades, but its essential
features remain the same.
3
the years 1989-1995 (using march CPS data). Although informative, because the data are highly age-trended
and the model builds in such trends, tests based on this kind of out-of-sample data may not be able to
discriminate finely among alternative models.  
5
Another type of model validation test makes use of regime shifts. For example, Lumsdaine, Stock and
Wise (1992) compared the ability of structurally and non-structurally estimated models to forecast the impact of
a pension “window plan” on the departure rates of workers from a single firm. The workers were subject to a
defined benefit plan that provided a significant incentive to remain with the firm until age 55 but to leave before
65. In 1982, there was a major change in the plan and vested workers over the age of 55 were offered a bonus to
retire. Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise (1992) compare forecasts of the models’ predictions about the impact of the
bonus on retirements, based on pre-1982 data, to actual retirements. The forecast is of a large change in the
pension rules, and thus  provides an arguably more convincing test of the validity of the model than do within-
sample tests.   
6
In this paper, we similarly use out-of-sample forecasts to assess the validity of a structurally estimated
model, but the comparison is to a completely new program rather than a change to an existing program.  We
7
study the Mexican school subsidy program PROGRESA. This program was implemented as a social experiment
beginning in 1997.   We obtain structural estimates of a model of household fertility and child schooling
84
decisions using data on the randomly selected control group and on the treatment group prior to the experiment,
for whom there are longitudinal data over three survey years. We assess the performance of the model by
comparing the impact of the program predicted by the model to the impact obtained under the experiment. By
design, the control and treatment groups are randomly drawn from the same population so that the behavioral
model relevant to the control group should be the same as the model relevant to the treatment group. This
experiment therefore represents a unique opportunity to assess the validity of a structurally estimated model. 
Previous studies in the program evaluation literature have also made use of social experiments to study
the performance of methods for estimating program effects using observational data. For example, Lalonde
(1986) compared estimates of the impact of a job training program based on a variety of nonexperimental
estimators to an experimental benchmark. More recently, Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) studied the
performance of a class of matching estimators in a similar context. The methods studied in that literature
typically require data on program participants and are therefore not suitable for evaluating the effect of
programs that have not been implemented. In contrast, the method adopted in this paper only requires data on
nonparticipants. We show that the existence of an active child labor market and variation in child wages, a
component of the opportunity cost of school attendance, can be used to identify the parameters of our
behavioral model, which enables us to forecast the effect of a school subsidy program without any variation in
the data in the direct cost of schooling.
 The model developed in this paper assumes that a married couple makes sequential decisions about the
timing and spacing of births and about the time allocation of children through age 15, including their school
attendance and labor market participation. Parents receive utility contemporaneously from the stock of children
and their current ages, their children’s current schooling levels and attendance and from their leisure time
(home production). Household consumption, which also yields contemporaneous utility, is enhanced by their
children’s earnings. The decision to bear a child (for a woman to become pregnant) is made over a finite
horizon beginning at the woman’s age at marriage and ending when the woman is no longer fecund (assumed to5
be age 43); decisions about the time allocation of children are made through age 59. Parent’s income is an
exogenous function of the husband’s age and the distance of the village of residence to the nearest large city.
Parental preferences and income and children’s earnings are subject to time-varying stochastic shocks.
Preferences, parental income and child wages differ permanently among households according to their type,
which is unobservable to us.
Attanasio, Meghir and Santiago (2001) develop and structurally estimate a quite different model of
schooling decisions that they also use to evaluate the impact of the PROGRESA program and of variations to
the subsidy schedule. The key differences are: (i) their model assumes that schooling is chosen to maximize
each individual child’s lifetime income disregarding the intra-household allocation decision of parents, and
their model does not incorporate a fertility decision; (ii) they use data from post-program treatment households
in estimating their model; (iii) they allow the income generated by working children to have a different effect
on schooling decisions than income generated by the school subsidy, which we cannot allow for because we do
not use post-program data in the estimation; and (iv) they estimate treatment impacts allowing for the
possibility that the control group may have anticipated plans to bring them into the program at a future date.
The empirical evidence presented about the importance of anticipatory effects is mixed, with some schooling
patterns better fit by a model that assumes no anticipation, but other patterns better fit by a model with
anticipation.
Our strategy of using the treatment group to validate the model assumes that the control group did not
expect to be brought into the program. We base this assumption mainly on accounts from PROGRESA
administrative personnel that special care was taken in administering the survey so as not to inform the control
group families about the existence of the program or about future plans to incorporate them. If there were
anticipatory effects, however, we would expect them to be present in 1998 but not in 1997, because the baseline
data were gathered at a time before the initiation of the program. Thus, we would expect our model, estimated
under the assumption of no anticipation, to fit the 1997 schooling patterns better than the 1998 patterns. As Wolpin (1996) reviews a number of examples in the context of discrete choice dynamic programming
9
models.
 For an alternative non-structural approach to analyzing the long-run impact of the PROGRESA
10
program, see Behrman, Sengupta and Todd (2000a).
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described later in the paper, the model fits similarly well for both years, which leads us to conclude that there is
no strong evidence of anticipatory effects. 
A structurally estimated model that is a valid representation of behavior can be used to evaluate the
impact of counterfactual policies.  In contrast, social experiments provide information only about the impact of
9
the program as it was implemented. They cannot be used to evaluate variations in the program or longer run
effects that extend beyond the life of the experiment, and they cannot be used to evaluate radically different
programs. Using the model’s estimates, we determine the impact of the program for alternative subsidy
schedules, including halving the subsidy level, doubling the subsidy level and subsidizing attendance only in
higher grades. In addition, we evaluate two radically different programs, one that provides a bonus for
graduating from junior secondary school but no other payments and one that provides an income subsidy 
without the school attendance requirement.
The model is also used to forecast long run impacts of the program, which might differ substantially
from the short-run impacts that are measured by the experiment. Even if the program was viewed by the
treatment group as permanent, the impact of the program measured by the experiment is conditioned on the
circumstances of the families at the time the program was initiated, e.g., the number of children they have and
their grade completion levels. The longer-run impact of the program may be to affect those circumstances. For
example, one long-run effect of a schooling subsidy may be to alter the number of children families have.
Another long-run impact may be to decrease the extent of discontinuous school attendance, leading to larger
long-run effects if returning to school after a period of non-attendance is viewed as costly.  Evaluating the
10
long-run effects of the program using an experimental approach would require that the experiment be continued
long enough to observe these changes, which is costly and often politically infeasible. We use the model to These households account for 40 percent of all rural households and 10 percent of all households in
11
Mexico (See Gomez de Leon and Parker (2000)).
 Children are required to attend at least 85% of days as verified by principals and teachers.
12




estimate what the completed family size and completed schooling would have been for the treatment families
had the program been in existence for their entire lifetimes.
In the next section, we provide relevant details of the PROGRESA program, followed in section III by a
description of the data used in the estimation. Section IV presents the model and estimation method and section
V the results of the estimation, including an assessment of the model’s validity and of counterfactual
experiments. The latter exercise is clearly dependent on the success of the model at forecasting the impact of
the subsidy program. The model does indeed perform quite well.
II. The PROGRESA Program:
We begin with a description of the PROGRESA program and the evaluation research that has already
been performed. PROGRESA is a large-scale anti-poverty and human resource program begun in Mexico in
1997 that now provides aid to about 10 million poor families.  The program was begun in rural areas and is
11
currently being expanded into semi-urban and urban areas. The major goal of the program is to stimulate
investments in children’s human capital. The program attempts to align household incentives with program
goals by providing transfer payments that are contingent on children’s regular attendance at school.  Programs
12
with features very similar to those of PROGRESA have been initiated in many other Latin American and Asian
countries.    
13
In recognition of the fact that older children are more likely to engage in family or outside work, the
transfer amount provided under the PROGRESA program varies with the child’s grade level. As seen in Table
1, it is greatest for children in junior secondary school (grades 7 through 9) and is also slightly higher for Prior to 1992, Mexico had compulsory schooling that required that children complete at least 6 years
14
of schooling. In 1992, the law was changed to require the completion of 9 years of schooling. However,
as our data show, the law is not strictly enforced. Although a large proportion of children complete 6
years of schooling, the vast majority complete less than 9.
 Some of this aid is contingent on visiting a health clinic. 
15
 The 506 localities were selected in a stratified random sampling procedure from localities identified by
16
PROGRESA to be eligible to participate in the program, because of a “high degree of marginality”
(determined mainly on the basis of analysis of data in the 1990 and 1995 population censuses (1990
Censo, 1995 Conteo)). There are 31 states in Mexico.
 However, the program has recently been expanded to include many of the control localities, so that it is
17
possible that the behavior of the controls groups over the time period we observe them could have been
influenced by their expectation of eventually receiving benefits. We present evidence about the existence
of anticipatory effects below.
8
female children, who traditionally have lower secondary school enrollment levels.  In addition to the
14
educational subsidies, the program also provides some monetary aid and nutritional supplements for infants and
small children that are not contingent on schooling.   In total, the benefit levels that families receive are
15
substantial relative to their income levels. The monthly average total cash transfer is US $55 (more than 75% is
due to the educational subsidy), which represents about one-fourth of average family income (Gomez de Leon
and Parker, 2000).
For purposes of evaluation, the second phase of the PROGRESA program was implemented as a
randomized social experiment, in which 506 rural villages (in 7 states) were randomly assigned to either
participate in the program or serve as controls.  Randomization, under ideal conditions, allows mean program
16
impacts to be assessed in a simple way through comparisons of outcomes for treatments and controls. Behrman
and Todd (2000b) provide evidence that is consistent with the randomization having been carefully
implemented. They document that the treatment and control groups are highly comparable prior to the initiation
of the program. Over the three year time period covered by our data, the households living in the control
villages did not receive program benefits.
17
The data gathered as part of the PROGRESA experiment provide rich information at the individual and Program eligibility is based in part on discriminant analysis applied to the October 1997 household
18
survey data. The discriminant analysis uses information on household composition, household assets
(such as whether the house had a dirt floor) and some other factors in determining program eligibility. 




household levels, including information on school attendance and achievement, employment and wages of
children and the income of the household. Data are available for all households located in 320 villages
randomly assigned to the treatment group and for all households located in 186 villages assigned to the control
group. The data that we analyze were gathered through two baseline surveys administered in October, 1997 and
March, 1998 and through three follow-up surveys administered October, 1998, May, 1999, and November,
1999. Households residing in treatment localities began receiving subsidy checks in the fall of 1998. In addition
to the household survey data sets, supplemental data gathered at the village level and at the school level are also
available, most importantly for our purpose, the travel distance to the nearest secondary school and to the
nearest city. 
Within treatment localities, only households that satisfy program eligibility criteria receive the school
subsidies, where eligibility is determined on the basis of a marginality index designed to identify the poorest
families within each community.  Because program benefits are generous relative to families’ incomes, most
18
families deemed eligible for the program decide to participate in it, although not all families are induced by the
transfers to send their children to school.   Data collection was exhaustive within each village and included
19
children from ineligible families. There are 9,221 separate households in the control villages and 14,856 in the
treatment villages.
Most of the existing research on the PROGRESA social experiment focuses on estimating the
experimental impacts through mean comparisons of various outcome measures for treatment and control
children. Gomez de Leon and Parker (2000) and Parker and Skoufias (2000) examine how children’s time use,
e.g., time spent working for pay, differs for children participating in the program. Shultz (2000) and Behrman, A landless household is defined as a household that reported producing no agricultural goods for
20
market sale. This restriction was adopted both to make the sample more homogeneous and smaller (to
reduce the computational burden) and to avoid having to model agricultural production, which would be
necessary if family child labor is not a perfect substitute for hired labor. We also restricted the sample to
nuclear households, which are the vast majority.
10
Sengupta, and Todd (2000a) analyze the effect of the program on school enrollment and attendance rates.
Figure 1, adapted from Behrman, Sengupta and Todd, shows the impact of the subsidy on school enrollment
rates by age and sex. Treatment impacts on enrollment rates are mainly confined to older ages, children
between the ages of 12 and 15, and are of similar magnitudes for girls and boys.   
III. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics:
Variable Definitions
Our estimation sample consists of landless households in which there was a woman under the age of 50
reported to be the spouse of the household head.  This restriction reduced the sample to 1,531 households
20
located in the control villages in 1997 and 2,162 households located in the treatment villages in 1997.
Additional exclusions based on missing or otherwise inconsistent data reduced the sample to 1,362 households
in the control villages (of which 1,355 are also observed in 1998) and 1,949 households in the treatment
villages. As of 1997, there were 4,501children born to the control households and 6,219 to the treatment
households, on average a little over 3 children per household. Of these, 2,096 children in the control village and
2,845 in the treatment villages are between the ages of 6 and 15 as of the October, 1997 survey. In contrast to
the entire sample, landless households tend to be poorer and, therefore, have a higher proportion of  eligible
households. As of the 1997 survey, about 52 percent of the all households were eligible to participate in the
program, while 66 percent of the landless households were eligible to participate. 
In estimating the behavioral model, we use data on both program eligible and ineligible households. 
Because eligibility depends on the number of children in the family, which is a choice variable in our model,
restricting the estimation sample to eligible families would create a choice-based sampling problem of the kind Given the specification of the model, which is described in detail in the next section, solving the
21
choice-based sampling problem would require knowledge of the distribution of unobserved family types
among both eligible and ineligible families. Using ineligible households also has the advantage of
increasing sample variability in parental income and initial conditions.
11
that often arises in program evaluation settings. We avoid the choice-based sampling problem by using data on
both eligible and ineligible families in estimating the model.  
21
Unfortunately, the PROGRESA data provide information concerning school attendance and work
essentially only at the survey dates. Therefore, allocating children to the school-work-at home categories that
pertain to an entire school year requires additional assumptions. In defining school attendance, we use the data
on school enrollment in the week prior to the survey and data on highest grade completed at the time of the
survey. Specifically, we used the following rule in determining school attendance during each of the two school
years, 1997-98 and 1998-99, covered by the surveys: (1) A child was considered as having attended school for
the entire year if a child that was reported as enrolled in at least one of the two surveys during each school year
and was reported as completing at least one grade level. (2) A child was considered as having not attended if the
child was reported as not enrolled in both surveys during each school year and did not complete a grade level.
(3) Essentially, all other problematic cases were hand-edited to provide a consistent sequence of attendance and
grade completion. A child who was determined to have attended school, but did not complete a grade level, was
assumed to have failed that school year. School attendance information was obtained for children between the
ages of 6 and 15. Highest grade completed was obtained for all children born to the woman.
A child was defined as working during the school year if the child did not attend school using the
criteria above and had been reported as working for salary (for 1997, in the October 1997 survey and for 1998,
in the October 1998 survey). The weekly wage was provided in the surveys for those who were reported
working in the week previous to the survey. A child was defined as being at home if the child was neither
attending school nor working. Parents’ weekly income was obtained from the October surveys and includes It is extremely rare, as reported in the survey, for children to have contributed to the self-employment
22
income of the household.
 Weeks worked during the year were not reported in the data.
23
  Although mean earnings of children would appear to be large relative to parents’ income, it should be
24
recognized that the figures for children represent the means of accepted wages, that is, the mean offered
wages for that relatively small fraction of  children that work. Our estimates, as described below, of the
mean of the offered wage distribution for children is about a third of the mean of the accepted wage
distribution. Because parents’ income is mostly composed of the income of working fathers and almost
all fathers work, the mean accepted and mean offered wages will be very close. 
12
market earnings of both parents as well as their self-employment income.  Both the children’s weekly wage
22
and the parents’ weekly income were multiplied by 52 to obtain an annual equivalent.  
23
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents basic sample statistics. The mean age of the wives in the sample as of 1997 is 30.5,
and that of their husbands 34.4. The mean age of marriage of the women is 18.1. On average, the families had 3
children as of 1997 and added another .2 children by 1998.The mean highest grade completed of children age 7
to 11 is 2.4 years of schooling, while children who were between the ages of 12 and 15 had completed 5.8
years, and those age 16 and over, 6.6 years. As also shown, there is almost no difference in the completed
schooling of this latter group by sex.  Parent’s income over the two survey years was, on average, about 12,000
pesos (approximately 1,100 U.S. dollars). Approximately 8 percent of children between the ages of 12 and 15
were working over the two years. Among those that worked, their average income ranged from about 6,000
pesos for those 12 and 13 years of age to about 9,000 pesos for those who were 15 years of age.   
24
Data were also collected about the households’ villages. Two “distance” variables are of particular
relevance: the distance from the village to a junior secondary school and the distance from the village to the
nearest city. As seen in Table 2, about one-quarter of the villages have a junior secondary school located in the
village, and among those villages that do not, the average distance to a village with a secondary school is We thank T. Paul Schultz for making this data available to us. 
25
 Child labor laws prohibit children under the age of 14 from working and also limit the kinds of
26
employment and the length of the work day. Our model assumes that these restrictions are not binding,
which is consistent with the fact that we observe children under the age of 14 who are working. A very
small number of children were working before the age of 12. We assumed that, in fact, they were at home
in order to avoid having to fit the model to those few observations.    
13
approximately three kilometers. The villages are also generally quite distant from major cities. The average
distance of the households from a city is 135 kilometers.  
25
Table 3 provides more detail concerning the time allocation of children. The first two columns contrast
the reported school attendance rates (in percent) of children by sex from ages 6 through 15 based on  the raw
data, whether or not the child was enrolled as of the October 1997 interview date (in column one), and the
revised rates based on the rules described above (in column 2). The third column shows the percentage of
children working for pay and the last column the percentage at home (100 - (2) - (3)).
As is apparent from comparing the first two columns, the revised attendance rates are slightly higher
than the raw attendance rates. Based on the revised rates, school attendance is almost universal from ages 7 to
11 for both boys and girls. Attendance at age 6 is lower, particularly for boys, although over 90 percent.
Attendance rates fall to 89 percent for males and to 90 percent for females at age 12, an age by which many
children have completed primary school (grade 6). After age 12, attendance rates continue to decline for both
girls and boys, but more rapidly for girls. By age 15, attendance rates are only 48 percent for boys and 40
percent for girls. The percentage of children working for pay at age 12 is only 2.5 for boys and 1.1 for girls. By
age 15, 28 percent of boys but only 16 percent of girls are working for pay.
26
Girls progress through the early grades somewhat faster than boys, but ultimately complete about the
same amount of schooling. As of October 1997, girls who are 12 years of age have completed about .3 more
years of schooling on average than have boys of the same age. At age 16, that difference has completely
disappeared, with both sexes having completed, on average, 6.6 years of schooling. Girls are more likely to
complete sixth grade, but are also more likely drop out of school after completing it. As seen in Table 4, among National examinations are given at each primary grade level and adequate performance determines
27
grade progression, although compliance is left to teachers. Certificates are awarded after the  completion
of primary school and junior secondary school.
 The duration to the first birth is calculated as the age of the woman in 1997 minus the age of the child
28
in 1997 minus the age of the woman at marriage. Ten percent of first births were reported to have
occurred at an age prior to the woman’s age at marriage and 14 percent coincident with the woman’s age
at marriage. For the cases where the birth occurred at or before the age at marriage, the marriage was
assumed to have occurred one year prior to the birth of the first child. An additional 26 percent of first
births occurred at an age one year post-marriage. The sum of these is about equal to the 52 percent of
first births occurring in the first year of marriage reported in the table.
14
the children in our sample who are age 15 or 16 in 1997, 22 percent of the boys and 17 percent of the girls have
less than 6 years of schooling, 32 percent of the boys and 39 percent of the girls have exactly 6 years of
schooling and 46 percent of the boys and 44 percent of the girls have more than 6 years of schooling. Failure
rates are slightly higher for boys than for girls, 15.2 percent for boys and 14.5 percent for girls over all grades,
but considerably higher at the primary grades, 15.7 percent vs. 13.9 percent.
27
Table 5 provides information about fertility patterns. In particular, it shows the duration distribution
from the date of marriage to the birth of each of the first three children. Fertility occurs rapidly after marriage.
A little more than 50 percent of the women had their first birth within a year of marriage.   First births occurred
28
within two years for seventy percent of the women. As the second column shows, of the women who had at
least two children, only 11 percent of the women had two births in two years, but 35 percent had their second
birth within 3 years of marriage and two-thirds within 5 years. About 10 percent did not have their second birth
until after 10 years of marriage. Over 20 percent of the women who have at least three children had their third
birth after 10 years of marriage. Thus, most women have their births quickly after marriage, although some
delay for a significant period. 
Once children leave school, they rarely return. As seen in Table 6, only 13 percent of boys age 13 to 15
who worked in one year attended school in the next year. Similarly of those who were home in one year, only
15 percent attended school in the next year. Comparable figures for girls are 20 percent (although the sample









 More precisely, in order to use the probability statement above to estimate the parameters, we need to
29
observe child wage offers. If we observe only accepted wages, that is, the wages of children who work,
then we need to able also to identify the parameters of the offered wage distribution together with 
and . Standard arguments for selection models hold for the identification of the wage offer parameters,
namely functional form and distributional assumptions. Identification of   and  requires an exclusion
restriction, a variable that affects the offered wage but not the family’s preference for child schooling.
Below, we discuss the specific identifying assumptions in the richer model that we estimate.
15
for both boys and girls, with 86.2 percent of the boys and 76.9 percent of the girls who attended school in one
year also attending in the next year. The home-to- home transition for girls and the work-to-work transition for
boys also exhibit such permanence. Among girls in this age group 92.5 percent of those who were home in one
year were also home in the next year, and among boys 62.5 percent of those who worked in one year were also
working the next year.      
IV. The Model:
An Illustrative Model and Identification of Subsidy Effects
Given that there is no direct cost of schooling through junior secondary school, and thus no variation
from which to directly estimate the impact of a subsidy to attendance, it is useful to consider an illustrative
model to demonstrate what information in the data would enable one to forecast the impact of the subsidy
program. Consider, then, a household with one child making a single period (myopic) decision about whether to
send the child to school or to work, the only two alternatives. Let utility of the household be separable in
consumption (C) and school attendance (s), namely u = C +  ( )s, where s=1 if the child attends school and
0 otherwise and   is a preference shock. Assume that the preference shock is normally distributed with mean
zero and variance  . The family’s income is y + w(1-s), where y is the parent’s income and w is the child’s
earnings if working. Under utility maximization, the family chooses to have the child attend school if and only
if  . The unknown parameters of the model are thus   and  . In this simple model, the probability that
family i’s child attends school is  . Clearly, it is both necessary and sufficient to obtain




 See Wolpin (1999) for a similar analysis of the informational content of probabilistic subjective
30
expectations.
 Although some information on contraceptive use is available, it is not detailed enough to allow
31
modeling contraceptive decisions.




Now, suppose the government is contemplating a program to increase school attendance of children
through the introduction of a subsidy to parents of amount b if they send their child to school. Under such a
program, the probability that a child attends school will increase by  . As this
expression indicates, knowledge of   and   is sufficient to forecast the impact of the program.  Moreover, it
30
is also sufficient to enable forecasts of the effect of varying the amount of the subsidy on school attendance.
Variation in the opportunity cost of attending school, the child market wage, thus serves as a substitute for
direct variation in the monetary (tuition) cost of schooling.
Model Description
In each discrete time period, a married couple makes fertility and child time allocation decisions.
Specifically, a decision is made about whether or not to have the woman become pregnant, and have a child in
the next period, and, for each child between the ages of 6 and 15, whether or not to send the child to school,
have the child work in the labor market (after reaching age 12) or have the child remain at home.  At ages older
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than 15, children are assumed to become independent, making their own schooling and work decisions. A
woman can become pregnant beginning with marriage (at age t =  ) and ending at some exogenous age (at t =
T-1) when she becomes infecund. The contribution of the husband and wife to household income is exogenous
(there are no parental labor supply decisions) and stochastic, and the household cannot save or borrow.  The
32
contributions to household income from working children (under the age of 16) are pooled with parental income
in determining household consumption.-
-- - n
--
 It is more straightforward to treat these costs as utility losses rather than monetary costs. Given that
33
monetary costs associated with school attendance are not observed in the data, consumption and psychic
costs are indistinguishable. 
 Bold type is used to indicate a vector.
34
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Children who neither attend school nor work for pay are assumed to contribute to household production
and thus to parental utility. Therefore, the cost of sending a child to school consists of the opportunity loss in
either home production or household income, each of which may differ by the child’s age and sex. Parents are
also assumed to derive utility in each period from the current average level of schooling that their children have
completed, from the current number of children who have graduated from elementary school (grade 6) and from
the current number who have graduated from junior secondary school (grade 9). Schooling is publicly provided
and therefore parents bear no direct tuition costs. All of the villages have their own primary schools (grades 1
through 6), but not all villages have junior secondary schools (grades 7 through 9). We allow for a psychic cost
of attending a junior secondary school that varies with the distance to the nearest village with a secondary
school, for a potential utility loss from interrupted schooling, that is, sending children to school who are behind
for their age and for an additional loss if a child attends grade 10, which often involves living away from
home.
33
More formally, let p(t) = 1 if a woman becomes pregnant at age t (and 0 otherwise) in which case a
child is born at t+1, n(t+1)=1. Further let b(t+1) = 1 if the child that is born is male (and 0 otherwise) and g(t+1)
= 1 if the child is female. Also, let p(t) be the vector of pregnancies up to age t, and n(t+1) be the corresponding
vector of births that occur up to age t+1, b(t+1) the corresponding vector of male births and g(t+1) the vector of
female births.  The stock of children through t (the sum of pregnancies through t -1) is denoted by N(t) = N(t-
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1) + n(t), and analogously the stock of boys by B(t) and that of girls by G(t). A child born at the woman’s age 
is zero years old at  and, thus, t -   years old at t. A child of birth order n is born at the woman’s age  . 
Let s(t,  ) = 1 if a child of age  t - , between the ages of 6, the minimum age of school eligibility, and
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otherwise. The corresponding vector of school attendance decisions for school age children at t  is s(t), where
an element is zero when there does not exist a child of a given age. Cumulative schooling at t for a child born at
 is given by S(t,  ) = S(t-1,  ) + c(t-1,  ) s(t-1,  ), where c(t-1,  ) =1 if a year of schooling is successfully
completed and zero otherwise. The completion of a grade level conditional on attendance is probabilistic. The
probability of completion is given by  , where   is a permanent family-
specific component of the success probability. The completion probability also may differ by the child’s sex.
The vector of cumulative schooling at t over all children is   and the mean schooling level of those children
at t,  . Sex-specific schooling variables are similarly defined and denoted with b or g subscripts.
Finally, let h(t,  ) = 1 if a child born at   works at t, and zero otherwise, with h(t) the corresponding
vector over all children at t. Children must be at least twelve years old to be eligible for work, i.e., h( +k,  )=0
for k<12. A child who is neither in school nor at work is by definition at home, which we denote as l(t,  ) =1 -
h(t,  ) - s(t,  ). Sex-specific variables, as before, carry b and g subscripts. 
The utility function is given by 
where C(t) is household consumption,  is the distance to a secondary school, the  ‘s are stochastic shocks to
being pregnant and to the value attached to having children of each sex at home and the  ‘s reflect permanent
differences across households in their preferences for children, for schooling and for the home time of children
by sex. The parental utility function (1) is written generally enough to include the possibility, for example, that
the value of household production is greater for older girls when there are also very young children in theyp yo
(2) C(t) 
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 It is the absence of economic theory about the form of the utility function and our inability to directly
35
elicit preferences that makes necessary pre-testing of the model.  
 Child rearing costs are essentially indistinguishable from the psychic value of children of different
36
ages, which is included in parental utility rather than in the budget constraint.
 Parental education does not directly affect income, but instead enters the parent income function
37
through its relationship to the unobservable parental type. 
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household. The exact representation of the utility function, which is shown in Appendix A, was determined in
part using model fit criteria.  
35
Family consumption at t is equal to total family income. Family income is the sum of parental income
( ) and the earnings of children ( ) who work in the market.  Thus, the family’s budget constraint is given
36
by
Income generating functions differ for parents and children. Parental income at t, which includes both
earnings and self-employment income, depends on the age of the male parent ( ) , on the distance of the
household’s village from a city ( ), a random shock at t ( ) and a permanent parent-specific unobservable
component ( ).  Similarly, the earnings of a child depends on the child’s age and sex, on the distance of the
37
household’s village from a city, on a time-varying (but not child-varying) shock ( ) and on a permanent
unobservable component ( ) that is the same for all children (within the same household). The distance from
a city affects wage offers due to differences in the skill price reflecting the extent of the labor market to which
the household has access. Specifically,  















 The implicit time-varying shock to grade completion is assumed to be independent of all other shocks
38
in the model.
 The integration is also performed over whether a birth outcome is a boy or a girl. We assume the
39
probability of each gender outcome to be .5.
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The five time-varying  -shocks are assumed to be jointly serially uncorrelated. Their joint
contemporaneous distribution is denoted by  .  The permanent components of parental preferences and
38
income, of child earnings and grade completion are also assumed to be jointly distributed according to  . In the
application, we assume g to be discrete with a fixed number of support points, which we denote as indicating
family “type.” These permanent components are known to parents from the beginning of the marriage.
At any t, the couple is assumed to maximize the present discounted value of remaining lifetime utility. In
any period, the family will face K(t) mutually exclusive alternatives, where K varies over time with the number of
children eligible to attend school and work and the woman’s age. Define   if the kth alternative is chosen at
t, and = 0 otherwise. (The ordering of the K(t) alternatives is irrelevant.) Further, define  to be the state space
at t, namely all of the relevant factors that affect current or future utility or that affect the distributions of future
shocks, that is, ,  ,  ,  ,  , ,  ,  , ,   .  
The maximized present discounted value of lifetime utility at t, the value function, is given by
where  is the end of the couple’s life (woman’s age 59) and the expectation is taken over the distribution of 
parental  preference and income shocks, the children’s earnings shock and the implicit shocks to grade completion
for choices that involve school attendance.  The solution to the optimization problem is a set of decision rules that
39
relate the optimal choice at any t, from among the feasible set of alternatives, to the elements of the state space at t.
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 Violations of the assumption in the 1997 survey occur in about 5% of the households in the case of
40
schooling and in about 1% of the households for working. 
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over alternative-specific value functions,  , i.e., the expected discounted value of alternative  ,
that satisfies the Bellman equation, namely
Model Solution:
The solution of the optimization problem is in general not analytic. In solving the model numerically, its
solution consists of the values of  for all k and elements of  . We refer to this
function as   for convenience. As seen in (5), treating these functions as known scalars for each value of the
state space transforms the dynamic optimization problem into the more familiar static multinomial choice structure.
The solution method proceeds by backwards recursion beginning with the last decision period.
There are two complications in solving the model numerically. First, at any fecund period in which there
are children of school and work age the choice set is of order  , where the first term represents the choice of
whether or not to have a child and the second reflects the number of joint school attendance - work choices (of
which there are 3) and  is the number of children age 12 to 15. For example, if there are three children
between the ages of 12 and 15, there are 54 possible choices. One way to reduce the size of the choice set in a way
that is for the most part consistent with the data is to assume that for each sex, a child may attend school only if all
younger children attend school and, independent of sex, a child may work for pay only if all older children work
for pay.   In the case of three children within the 12 to 15 age range, if they are of the same sex the number of
40330

 Stinebrickner (2001) develops a local approximation to the Emax function.
41
 Only about 3 percent of women in our sample report having more that eight children. In the empirical
42
implementation, we assume that children of birth order greater than eight were not born. 
We used 2500 state points for the estimation of the Emax approximations and 50 draws for the
39
numerical integrations. The Emax approximations did not appear to be sensitive to increases in these
parameters, up to 10,000 state points and 300 draws. There were approximately 150 variables used in the
Emax approximation, which includes interactions among the state variables. The R-squares were above
.99 in all time periods.
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alternatives is now reduced to 20. We do not impose these restrictions on 6 and 7 year old children to
accommodate the fact that school entry is sometimes delayed. 
Second, the size of the state space makes a full solution of the problem computationally intractable. The
Emax functions must be calculated for all state values at each t. As long as the ages of children affect lifetime
utility, as it must because of the age restrictions on children’s eligibility for schooling and work, the state space
will include the entire sequence of births by sex and not simply the stock of children. With 30 fecund periods, there
are  such sequences. In addition at any t, the schooling level of each child affects expected lifetime utility at t.
To solve the dimensionality problem, we adopt an approximation method in which the Emax functions are
expressed as a parametric function of the state variables or composites of the state variables, using methods
developed in Keane and Wolpin (1994, 1997, 1999). In particular, the Emax functions are calculated at a subset of
the state points and their values are used to fit a global polynomial approximation in the state variables.   To
41
further limit the size of the state space, we also assume that women can have no more than eight children.  As in
42
Keane and Wolpin, the multivariate integrations necessary to calculate the expected value of the maximum of the




The solution to the agents’ maximization problem serves as input into estimating the parameters of the



















functions that appear on the right hand side of (5). The alternative-specific value functions, V (t) for k=1,..,K(t),
k
are known up to the parental random preference and  income shocks and the earnings shock of the children. Thus,
conditional on the deterministic part of the state space, the probability that an agent is observed to choose option k
takes the form of an integral over the region of a subset of the random shocks such that k is the preferred option.
Specifically, in the decision model presented above the observed outcomes at each period include (i) the
choice (from the feasible set) made by the couple of whether or not to initiate a pregnancy, which children to send
to school, which to work in the market and which to remain at home, (ii) the wages received by the children who
work in the market, (iii) the success or failure of those children who attend school to complete a grade level and
(iv) parental income. Let the outcome vector at t be denoted by  . Suppose we observe
these outcomes for a sample of N households beginning at marriage, t =  , and ending at some t= . Then, the
likelihood for this sample is 
where  is the observable components of the initial state space at the time of marriage, that is, the state space 
net of the family’s type (the   vector) and stochastic shocks at t = . The observable part of the state space at
marriage consists only of the age of the woman at   , the age of the man at   and distance from a secondary
school and from a city. Because type is unobserved, it must be integrated out. Thus, the sample likelihood is 
We assume that the initial conditions, the ages of marriage of both parents and the distances, are exogenous
conditional on type.
There are two additional considerations in computing the likelihood. Because we assume that the child
wage shock is family-specific, having an observation on the wage for two children in the same family working in





  We follow this strategy as opposed to allowing for child-specific wage shocks to avoid having to
40
integrate over all of the child shocks in calculating the Emax functions. The problem of degeneracy exists
more generally, namely that with family level shocks some choices may not be generated by the model.
Restricting the choice set as above reduces the likelihood of this event, but does not eliminate it
necessarily. Estimation is feasible when such events occur because our procedure smooths over zero
likelihood events (see below). After estimating the model, we verified that simulations of the model
could generate all of the outcomes that were observed in the data, so none of these outcomes has zero
probability of occurrence.
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child age and sex as in (3)) will lead to a degenerate likelihood. We therefore assume that the children’s wages are
measured with error, which seems like a reasonable assumption in any event.   Thus, assuming a multiplicative
44
measurement error, observed child earnings is given by  . 
Another difficulty arises because, for most of the families, we do not observe decisions from the start of
marriage. In particular, although we have a complete fertility history for all women, we do not have a complete
school attendance and work history for children who are above the school or work eligibility ages at the first
survey. For example, consider a family with 3 children whose ages are 10, 13 and 16 as of the October 1997 survey
date and whose marriage occurred in 1980 when the woman was age 19 ( ). For this family, we observe fertility
outcomes at every t between 1980 and 1997, the woman’s age 19 through 36. However, we are missing the
complete history of school decisions for all children above the age of 6, and the work decisions for all children
above the age of 12, as of 1997. Although it is conceptually straightforward to accommodate this feature of the
data into the likelihood function (7), it is computationally infeasible to perform the integrations over all of the
feasible unobserved choice paths as would be required to calculate the likelihood. 
To avoid having to deal with missing data on the schooling and work decisions of children, one could 
restrict the sample to marriages that occurred between 1989 and 1997 for whom there are complete data. But for
the earliest marriages in this range, the oldest age a child could be in 1997 is 6, the first age at which a schooling
decision is made. It is obviously not possible to identify all of the parameters of the model solely from those


























For all families, we observe the complete set of outcomes in the two survey years, 1997 and 1998. The
difficulty in using that data is that the state variables at the time of the surveys, including for instance the birth
history and the schooling levels of all children, are not exogenous.  The assumption of serial independence in the
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shocks, however, implies that the state variables at any time t are exogenous with respect to decisions at t
conditional on type. Thus, the likelihood for the observations in 1997 and 1998 can be written, analogous to (7),
 
where  and    are the ages of the woman in 1997 and 1998. A problem with (8) is that we must specify how
the type distribution is related to the state variables. In actuality, the form of this conditional distribution function
is given by the structure of the behavioral model together with the relationship between type and the initial state
variables, i.e., the second term in (7). There is clearly a trade-off in how one specifies this conditional type
distribution. The more flexible the functional form the better the approximation to its true functional form and the
closer the exogeneity requirement is met. However, the more flexible the form, the more parameters there are to
estimate. Furthermore, these parameters are themselves functions of the structural parameters; the estimation
method is thus not efficient.  
To summarize, in estimating the model we use (7) for the families with complete decision histories as
described above (Sample A) and we use (8) for the families with incomplete decision histories (Sample B),
ignoring the information about pregnancy decisions made prior to 1997 . Now, given the assumption of joint serial
independence of the vector of shocks (conditional on type), both (7) and (8) can be written as the product of
within-period outcome probabilities conditional on the corresponding state space and type. Each of these























 For ease of exposition, we have ignored parents’ income in the formulation of the likelihood function
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as well as whether the children that were sent to school failed to progress to the next grade level. The
modifications of (9) to account for these additional observable variables are straightforward and in
estimation we take them into account in evaluating the likelihood.
  The kernel smoothed frequency simulator we adopt was proposed in McFadden (1989). For each of K
47
draws of the error vector,  , noting that    is chosen to satisfy the 
observed wage for each child, that is, inclusive of the measurement error. The kernel of the integral is   
VKOGU VJG LQKPV FGPUKV[ QH the observed and true 
wage, where the j superscript denotes the vector of value functions over all alternatives. The first term in
the kernel is the smoothed simulator of the probability that   = 1, with  , the smoothing parameter,
set equal to 10, which provided sufficient smoothing given the magnitudes of the value functions. See
Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) for further applications.
26
To illustrate the calculation of the likelihood, it is sufficient to consider a specific outcome at some period.
Suppose that the kth alternative that is chosen at period t is to send at least some children to work. The children
who work are observed to have wages given by  , where j signifies the jth working child and the superscript
“obs” distinguishes the observed wage from the true wage,  . Then the likelihood contribution for such an
observation is (for a given type)
 
where “~” signifies the vector of child wages over j and the integration is of the same order as the number of
children who work.  Notice that it is necessary to integrate over the vector of true wages in (9) because the choice
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probability depends on true wages , which we observe only with error. Probability statements for other alternative
choices are calculated similarly. We calculate the right hand side of (9) by a smoothed frequency simulator.
47
The entire set of model parameters enters the likelihood through the choice probabilities that are computed
from the solution of the dynamic programming problem. Subsets of parameters enter through other structural
relationships as well, e.g., child wage offer functions, the parents’ income function and the school failure00
01<0
02>0 03<0
 Identification in the model is achieved through a combination of functional form (for example, the
48
CRRA utility function, normality of error distributions) and exclusion restrictions. As discussed in the
illustrative example, identification of the variance in the preference shock to leisure (school attendance in
the example) can be obtained if at least one variable that affects the child wage offer function does not
affect the preference for leisure. The distance of the village to a city serves here as this exclusion
restriction. However the model would also be identified in the absence of this restriction because child
age is parameterized differently in the wage function than elsewhere, which essentially also serves as an
exclusion restriction.
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probability function.  The estimation procedure, i.e., the maximization of the likelihood function, iterates between
the solution of the dynamic program and the calculation of the likelihood.   
V. Results
Parameter Estimates
The precise functional forms of the model’s structure are provided in appendix A.  Parameter estimates,
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and their standard errors, are provided in appendix table A.1. Most of the parameters are not of direct interest,
although a few may be worth highlighting. In particular, the CRRA parameter ( ) is .87, implying that utility is
close to linear in consumption. Consumption is a substitute in utility with fertility ( ), a complement with the
average school attainment of children ( ) and a substitute with the leisure of children age 12 to 15 ( ). 
The model was fit with three household types, where types differ with respect to their underlying
preferences (for fertility, child schooling and child leisure), school failure rates, parental income potential and
child earnings potential. The three types have distinctly different behaviors. As seen in table 7, type 1 households,
comprising 36 percent of the sample, and type 3's, comprising 8 percent of the sample, value schooling less than
type 2's.  However, type 1's and type 3's also differ; the percent of the youngest children, age 6 to 11, from type 3
households who attend school is considerably lower than those from type 1 households. Moreover, in terms of
schooling overall, type 1 households seem to favor boys and type 3 households girls, with type 2 households
exhibiting little sex-bias. Children age 12 to 15 from type 2 households are least likely to work. And, although




households are considerably more likely to work, and concomitantly, less likely to be at home. Child offered
wages, on the other hand, differ very little among the types and are only about one-third as large as mean accepted
wages, while parental income is 20 percent higher for type 2's than for type 1's or 3's. Type 2 household's, in
addition to sending their children to school at a higher rate, are much less likely to have an additional pregnancy
during the year than either of the other types, about two-thirds less likely.  
Within-Sample Fit
We next present evidence on the within-sample fit of our model along various dimensions of the data.
Table 8 compares the model’s prediction of the distribution of child activity allocations (school, work or home) at
individual ages by sex to the actual distribution and reports the relevant chi-square statistic for the null that they
are the same. At younger ages, when school attendance is nearly universal, the model predicts an attendance rate
nearly identical to the actual rate. Between ages 11 and 12, when attendance drops as children finish primary
school, the model captures this drop for both boys and girls. It predicts a 11.8% drop for boys compared to an
actual drop of 9.2% and a 9.4% drop for girls compared to an actual drop of 7.3%.  The model also fits the choices
between working for pay and staying at home. For example, it captures the pattern in the data that teenage girls are
twice as likely as teenage boys to be at home at age 15, while teenage boys are more likely to work for pay. As
seen in the table, the null that predicted and actual rates are the same is never rejected at the 5 percent level.
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Table 9 compares the actual and predicted school attendance rates for children whose schooling attainment
differs from their maximum potential, defined as the level they could have achieved had they enrolled at age 6 and
attended school continuously without repeating grades. The predicted rates for the subgroups that are not behind in
school are about 5% too low (the null is rejected at the 5 percent level), but the attendance rates for the other
subgroups are within 1-2% of the actual rates. Table 10 compares the observed wages of children who are working
to the wages for working children predicted under the model. The model’s predicted (accepted) wages tend to be29
too high relative to the observed (accepted) wages. Averaged over the ages of 12 through 15, the mean accepted
wage is approximately 10 percent too high for boys and 28 percent too high for girls. 
The Test of Model Validity: Comparison of Impacts Predicted Under the Model to Experimental Impacts
Given the parameter estimates, it is straightforward to predict the impact of the school subsidy program on
school attendance. A subsidy paid to the family for each child that attends school augments family income and
affects the family’s school attendance and fertility decisions by changing the family budget constraint (2).
Resolving the optimization problem for each family in the presence of the subsidy will lead to a different pattern of
school attendance and fertility decisions. Comparing the decisions of the treatment group predicted under the
model to their actual decisions (at the same stage in the life cycle and for the same state variables) provides a direct
out-of-sample test of the model’s validity.   
We predict the subsidy effects in two different ways. A one-year ahead prediction uses information on the
state variables in a base year (1997 or 1998) to forecast the effects of the program during the subsequent year. An
N-year ahead prediction makes use only of information on initial conditions, i.e. the age of the wife and husband at
marriage, parental education levels, and the distances to schools and to the nearest city. Using the initial conditions
and the estimated model parameters, we simulate from the beginning of marriage the couples’ fertility and
school/work/home choices over their lifetime. This long-term prediction is used to evaluate the consequences of
long-term participation in the PROGRESA subsidy program on fertility and schooling, as described below. 
One-year ahead (short-term) predictions
Table 11 compares the actual and predicted school attendance rates for different categories of children,
defined by age, gender and completed schooling, in the control and treatment groups. The only group that received
the subsidy is the treatment group in 1998. This group was not used in fitting the model and, therefore, a
comparison of the predictions shown in the last two columns of the table with the actual attendance rates represent
an out-of-sample test of the model’s validity. The table also presents within-sample comparisons for the control
group in 1997 and 1998 and for the treatment group in 1997. As seen in the first two rows of the table, predicted We also looked at more restricted age ranges For12-13 year old girls (145 children), the actual and
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predicted attendance rates were 86.9 vs. 85.7 percent and for boys (141 children), 89.4 vs. 87.6 percent.
For 14-15 year old girls (78 children), the actual and predicted rates were 57.3 vs. 51.3 and for boys (121
children) 61.2 vs. 65.6 percent. Although the differences are somewhat larger than in the combined 12-15
year old group, they are still quite close, especially considering that the predictions could range up to100
percent attendance. 
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attendance rates usually come within 1-2 percent of the actual attendance rate for all the groups in the 6-11 age
category. In 1998, the model predicts an attendance rate for the treatment group equal to 97.1% for both boys and
girls, compared to actual attendance rates of 98.5 percent and 98.7 percent. For children age 12 to 15, the predicted
attendance rates tend to be a few percentage points lower than the actual rates for the 1997 treatment and control
groups and the 1998 control group. However, the predictions for the 1998 treatment group are very close to the
experimental impacts. The predicted attendance rate is within 1 percentage point of the rate observed under the
experiment (74.9 vs. 74.4 percent for girls and 77.1 vs. 76.3 percent for boys).
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To further assess the validity of the model, we restrict the sample of children age 12 -15 to those who are
behind in school. As would be expected, attendance rates are lower for those who are already behind in school. In
that case as well, the predicted attendance rate with the subsidy is quite close to the actual (72.3 vs. 71.4 percent
for girls and 72.9 vs. 71.6 percent for boys). Further restricting this last sample to those who  have completed the
6  grade leads to considerably lower attendance rates and poorer prediction. The model overpredicts attendance
th
rates by 7.2 percentage points for girls and by 8.4 percentage points for boys, although the experimental treatment
effect is not precisely estimated for these subsamples.
Table 12 compares the model’s predicted impacts of the subsidy on attendance to the experimental impact
estimates. Three different ways of computing the experimental impacts are shown in the row labeled
“Experimental Treatment Effect.” The cross-section effect is the average attendance rate for the treatment group
minus the average rate for the control group in the post-subsidy year, 1998. The longitudinal impact estimate is the
difference in the post-subsidy and pre-subsidy attendance rates for the treatment group. Finally, the difference-in-
difference estimate subtracts from the cross-sectional impact estimate the pre-subsidy (1997) difference betweenRecall that we focus on the subsample of landless households. Interestingly, in the full sample, which
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includes also landed households, the experimental impacts for boys are larger and tend to be of similar
magnitude to those of girls. See Figure 1.
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the groups’ attendance rates. “*” denotes whether the impact estimates are statistically significant under the
experiment at a 10% level.  
Predicted subsidy effects are shown for three different categories of children (the last three in the previous
table) for the control group in 1997 and 1998 and for the treatment group in 1997. For example, the model
predicts an impact of 10.1% for treatment group girls age 12-15 in 1997. That is, given the state space for
households in the treatment group as of (October) 1997, this figure represents the difference between the
attendance rate of girls during the 1997/1998 school year that is predicted by the model if the subsidy had been in
force and the actual attendance rate. This predicted subsidy effect falls within the range of the experimental
estimates (7.9%-10.3%). For the control groups, the estimates are close but slightly below the range. Similarly, the
estimates of the subsidy effects for girls who are behind in school are also close to the actual treatment effects.
However, predicted subsidy effects are less accurate for boys. The experimental impact estimates for boys are
smaller and are not usually statistically significantly different from zero, while the model’s predicted subsidy
impacts are of a similar magnitude for girls and boys. The experimental impacts, especially for the boys that are
behind and have completed the 6  grade, are considerably too high.  
th         51
As a further evaluation of the model’s performance, Table 13 presents evidence on the model’s ability to
forecast the full school/work/home choice distribution, by sex, for the 1998 treatment group for all children age
12-15, for children of those ages not behind in school, those behind in school and those behind who have
completed 6  grade. The model predicts well the rates of staying home or working for pay (usually within 2% of
th
the actual rates) and it captures the differences in the work/home pattern between boys and girls, although as
before not as well for the last category. 
N-year ahead (long-term) predictions32
Social experiments usually last only a few years, because they are typically very expensive and because it
is often politically infeasible to deny those in the control group access to the treatment for a long time period.  The
short-term nature of experiments limits the usefulness of experimental data in evaluating the long-term
consequences of programs like PROGRESA. However, PROGRESA’s long-term effects are arguably of greater
interest than its short-term effects, because the policy change being considered is that of making it a permanent
feature of Mexico’s social welfare system. As described earlier, short- and long-term consequences of
PROGRESA may be quite different. For example, it may be difficult over the short-term to bring children who
have dropped out back into school; but if the program were available from the beginning, it may prevent dropping-
out. We, therefore, evaluate the performance of the model in making long-term forecasts by using it to predict
school and fertility outcomes at the survey dates using only information on initial conditions.
Table 14 shows the actual and predicted school attendance rates obtained from that simulation exercise
for the control sample in 1997 and 1998 and for the treatment sample in 1997 (at the baseline). The predictions
shown in the table represent a within-sample fit test of the model’s ability to make accurate long-term forecasts of
attendance rates in the absence of the subsidy. The N-year ahead predictions of attendance rates are clearly not as
accurate as the one-year ahead predictions and tend to underpredict attendance rates. Nevertheless,  the
predictions are still reasonably good. For example, for the 12-15 year old age category, the predicted attendance
rates are between 6 and 10 percentage points below the actual rates. In comparison, the difference between them
based on one-step ahead forecasts ranged from 0 to 5 percentage points. The last four rows of the table show the
model’s predictions of pregnancy rates for women of different age ranges. They are usually within 2-3 percentage
points of the actual rates. 
Given that the model’s longer range forecasts of fertility and school attendance rates are reasonably
accurate, we now use the model to predict the long-term impact of exposure to the PROGRESA subsidy program.
That is, we predict the effect of the subsidy on family choices for the control and treatment groups at each survey Our long-term forecasts assume that the families will be eligible over their entire lifetimes. In reality, a
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family could become ineligible, for example, by accumulating certain assets, such as a car. Given that our
model does not incorporate asset accumulation, we do not take into account that eligibility may change
with changes in assets. However, our model does allow families to change fertility decisions to become
eligible for program subsidies. 
 N is the number of years between the time of marriage and 1997 and ranges from 8 to 38 years in the
53
sample used for the simulations.
 The predictions of mean schooling and the percentage of children completing 6  grade or more are also
54 th
quite accurate. In the sample of eligible households, girls age 16 to 20 in 1997 had completed 6.30 and
boys 6.41 years of schooling (with completed schooling as in the model and table truncated at 10 years)
and the percent completing at least 6  grade is 75.0 for girls and 73.4 for boys. However, the percentage
th




date assuming that the program had been available to them from the time of marriage.  Table 15 compares the
52
short-run (one-year ahead) and long-run (N-year ahead) predictions of the program on school attendance rates for
girls and boys age 12-15.  As expected, long-run impacts are larger than the short-run impacts; however, they
53
only exceed the short-run effects by 0.5-1.5 percentage points. Therefore, the estimates suggest that much of the
effect of the program on attendance is observed over the short-run.
Tables 16 and 17 report estimated long-term impacts on completed schooling and fertility. These
estimates are obtained by simulating fertility and schooling outcomes from the mother’s age at marriage through
age 59, when all the children in the family would be at least 16 years of age. The model predicts that without the
subsidy, girls will complete 6.29 years and boys 6.42 years of schooling. Had the program been in existence from
marriage, given our estimates, children’s mean years of completed education at age 16  would have increased by
0.54 years for both girls and boys. The model also predicts an increase in girls completing 6  grade by 6.4
th
percentage points and in boys by 4.5 percentage points. Increases in 9  grade completion rates are predicted by the
th
model to be 6 percentage points for girls and 5.3 percentage points for boys.    
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Although the impacts of the program on attendance rates and schooling attainment are substantial, table
18 provides little evidence for an effect of the program on fertility. Without the subsidy, the predicted long-run Failure rates differ significantly among the types. Type 2's complete almost 9 years of schooling under
55
the compulsory school attendance requirement, while type 3's complete less than 6.5 years.
 This experiment is the flip side of the natural experiment that Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) exploit
56
in which the impact on mean child schooling of an additional exogenous birth associated with a twin
birth is used to test the quality-quantity fertility model. The above result, that fertility declines with an
exogenous increase in mean schooling, arises because the increase in the per-child cost of schooling with
distance from a junior secondary school is large enough to compensate for the estimated complementarity
of mean schooling and fertility. 
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average number of children is 4.24 in comparison to 4.28 with the subsidy. There is also little change in the
distribution of numbers of children across families.
Counterfactual Subsidy Experiments
Designing an optimal subsidy scheme to achieve some desired increase in schooling requires knowledge
of the effects of many alternative subsidy schedules. As discussed earlier, a limitation of experimental data is that
they are only informative about the effects of the particular experiment that was implemented and do not provide a
reliable way of extrapolating to learn about effects of counterfactual policies. Although a small change in the
subsidy schedule might be well approximated by a simple extrapolation of the experimental treatment effect, any
extrapolation to a more radical change in the subsidy schedule would be ad hoc. For example, one might be
interested in evaluating an unconditional income grant to families that removes the school attendance requirement,
or a bonus system that rewards the completion of certain grade levels.
Table 18 reports the results of a number of counterfactual experiments based on simulations to the
mother’s age 59 as in the previous two tables. The first column reports predictions of completed schooling and
fertility at the baseline. To establish an upper bound for the effect of alternative subsidy schemes on school
completion levels, the second column reports the effect of a perfectly enforced school attendance requirement for
all children between the ages of 6 and 15. Although maximum completed schooling by age 16 is 10 years, because
failure rates are significant, mean completed schooling with compulsory attendance is only 8.29 years for girls and
8.37 for boys, an increase over the baseline of about 2 years for both.  Fertility declines very slightly with
55
compulsory school attendance.  
56 In a static quality-quantity fertility model, Willis (1973) shows that a decrease in the per-child price of
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quality, e.g., a subsidy to school attendance, will increase fertility as long as quality and quantity are
complements in utility. We find that average schooling and numbers of children are indeed complements
in the per-period utility function (see appendix table A.1). We would expect the basic intuition of that
model to also hold in the more complex model that we estimate.
 Moreover, relative to the original subsidy there is a substantially smaller gain in the fraction of
58
children graduating from elementary school (6  grade), although offset by a slight gain in the fraction of
th
children graduating from junior secondary school (9  grade). With the restricted subsidy, 77.6 percent of
th
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 The next column again shows the effect of the original subsidy scheme as in the previous two tables, and
the following two columns report experiments in which the subsidy amounts are first doubled and then halved. As
seen in the table, completed fertility is essentially invariant to subsidy levels, increasing slightly as subsidy levels
rise.   Mean completed schooling increases at a linear rate with increments in subsidy amounts up to the original
57
amount and then at a diminishing rate. For example, for girls the increases in mean schooling between the baseline
and one-half of the original subsidy and between one-half and the full original subsidy amount are both .27, while
the increase from doubling the subsidy amount is .47 years. However, whether there are diminishing returns to the
program depends, in addition, on how the total cost of the program increases with the subsidy levels. The next to
the last row of the table, which calculates the average cost of the subsidy program on a per family basis, shows
that doubling the subsidy amounts more than doubles the per family cost. Based on these figures, the change in
average schooling induced by a unit change in total costs is 41% higher at the one-half subsidy level than at the
full subsidy level. 
The next column restricts the subsidy to attendance in the 6  grade or higher, that is, the subsidy is zero for
th
attending grades 3 through 5. Because the great majority of children complete at least the 5  grade, the subsidy to
th
the earlier grades acts mainly as a direct income transfer program and might have, therefore, only a small effect on
schooling although a large effect on the cost of the program. As seen, restricting the subsidy to higher grades
reduces the per-family cost of the program considerably, from around 26,000 pesos to less than 16,000 pesos.
Perhaps surprisingly, however, the fall in completed schooling is also not insignificant, with approximately 30
percent of the gain in mean schooling for girls and 33 percent for boys being lost.
58girls and 80.0 percent of boys graduate from elementary school, an increase of 1.6 percentage points for
girls and 0.8 for boys as compared to increases of 6.5 and 4.5 percentage points with the original subsidy.
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The reason that restricting the subsidy to attendance in higher grades only has a non-negligible impact on
completed schooling levels is due to the interdependence of parental decisions among children within the family. If
there are multiple children of school age in the household, providing a subsidy to attendance for children at lower
grades, because it increases family income, increases the incentive for older children to attend higher grades rather
than to produce additional income through work. That this intra-household allocation mechanism is important can
be seen from the fact that the reduction in the gain from the subsidy under the restriction falls with the number of
children ever born. In one child families, mean completed schooling is 8.66 under both the original subsidy and
under the restricted subsidy, a zero percent reduction in the gain, in two child families 8.54 and 8.51, a 12.5
percent reduction, in three child families 8.30 and 8.24, a 16.7 percent reduction, and in four child families 7.51
and 7.36, a 29 percent reduction. The reduction in the gain is about 35 percent in families with five or more
children. 
In light of this finding, the next column reports an experiment in which the subsidy is again restricted to
attendance in grades 6 through 9, but the subsidy schedule is set at a level (1.43 times the subsidy amounts at each
grade) at which the cost per family is the same as the original subsidy without the restriction (column 2). Relative
to the original subsidy, the gain in mean completed schooling is predicted to be .14 years for girls and .11 years for
boys, an increase of about 25 percent over the original gain. There is also a difference, as  compared to the original
subsidy, in the distribution of completed schooling, with a very slight increase in the proportion of children
completing less than 6 years of schooling and a significant increase in the proportion completing 9 or more years.
Ignoring distributional impacts, namely that families whose children do not attend the higher grade levels receive
no income transfer under the restricted subsidy program, the restricted subsidy program would appear to be more
efficient in producing higher completed schooling levels in this population. Keane and Wolpin (2000) assess such bonus-type schemes in the U.S. context.
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 The effect of a bonus program would also be sensitive to assumptions about the ability of families to
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smooth consumption intertemporally. Increased opportunities to smooth consumption through
saving/borrowing would presumably increase the value of large lump-sum payments. Recall that, in the
model, families cannot smooth consumption between periods at all. However, our estimates imply that
utility is close to being linear in consumption so that the capability to smooth consumption is not of great
relevance. 
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An alternative subsidy scheme rewards completion rather than attendance. In the next column, we assess
the impact of ninth grade graduation bonus in the form of a payment of 30,000 pesos to families when a child
graduates from junior secondary school.  Clearly, the effect of such a bonus scheme requires, as the model
59
assumes, that families be forward-looking.   The simulations show that the bonus increases the percentage of
60
children completing junior secondary school significantly, by about ten percentage points for both girls and boys,
but has a relatively small impact on average schooling. In fact, the increase in average schooling is not as large as
the effect of the original subsidy even though the cost of the bonus program is about 50 percent higher.
Interestingly, the proportion of children who complete at least 6  grade actually falls below the non-subsidy level,
th
suggesting that families are substituting more schooling for some children and less for others. Thus, the effect of
the bonus is largely to induce children who were already attending junior secondary school to complete ninth
grade. 
The additional interventions we consider all have rather small effects on schooling. In particular, enforcing
a child labor law prohibiting children under the age of 16 from working and building a junior secondary school in
each village where it is absent each would raise mean schooling by .1 years or less. We also simulate the impact of
a pure income transfer program, one that pays 5000 pesos per year to families without any school attendance
requirement. This amount is close to the maximum benefit that families may currently receive under the program in




due to the subsidy as schooling is a normal good.  However, the increase in schooling is only about 20 percent as
61
large as the original attendance-based subsidy. Moreover, its cost per family is an order of magnitude larger.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper, we have used a social experiment that subsidized school attendance of children in rural
Mexico to evaluate the validity of a forward-looking model of family decision-making about fertility and child
schooling. The model was estimated on control families who did not have access to the program and on treatment
families prior to the existence of the program. The problem in identifying the impact of subsidies is that there are
no direct costs of attending school that could serve as information from which the effects of the subsidy program
could be extrapolated. However, given the existence of an active child labor market, we showed that variation in
child wages, the opportunity cost of attending school, coupled with the assumptions necessary to implement the
structural estimation of our behavioral model, could serve to identify the model’s parameters and, from those
estimates, simulate the impact of the program.
 We found that the model provided an accurate forecast of the effect of the program, as given by the
experiment, on school attendance rates of children, although the forecast was better for girls than for boys. Given
this evidence on the model’s performance, we simulated a number of counterfactual policy experiments that
illustrate a menu of options that could be placed before policy-makers. We provided information on the long run
benefit and cost trade-offs associated with doubling the subsidy at all grade levels, of halving it, of restricting it to
only higher grade levels, of providing a bonus for graduation from junior secondary school and of a pure income
transfer program.
An important caveat to our evaluation of the long-run impact of counterfactual experiments is that our
analysis is partial equilibrium. As school attendance rates rise due to the program, and children withdraw from the We assume that parental income would be unchanged, although there may be an effect on adult wages
62
depending on the degree to which child and adult labor are substitutes.
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child labor market, one would expect child wage rates to rise and the increase in school attendance rates due to the
subsidy to be somewhat mitigated. Although our forecast of the subsidy effect does not incorporate such a labor
market equilibrium response and is yet quite accurate, such adjustments in the child labor market may require time.
To get some idea of the quantitative significance of the equilibrium effect, we also performed a counterfactual
experiment which combines the original subsidy program with a concomitant increase in child wage rates of 25
percent.  The results of that experiment are shown in the last column of table 18. The degree of mitigation of the
62
increase in mean schooling differs by sex. For girls, the increase above the baseline accounting for the wage
increase is 85 percent of the partial equilibrium effect of the original subsidy, while for boys it is only 69 percent.
Of course this example is at best illustrative because we do not know how elastic is the demand for child labor. A
complete analysis would require a general equilibrium model of the rural labor market, which we leave for future
work.. 
One lesson that we draw from this validation exercise is that there is a potential synergy between the
implementation of social experiments and the structural estimation of behavioral models. It arises because of, on
the one hand, the inherent limitation of social experiments to exhaustively explore the impacts of competing
policies and, on the other, the difficulty in providing credible evidence of the validity of counterfactual policy
experiments that are based on structural estimates of behavioral models. Exploiting the strengths of both
methodologies requires, as in PROGRESA, that data collected from social experiments go significantly beyond the
more limited types of data  necessary for the simple estimation of treatment effects. We view this paper as an
example of one such effort to exploit this synergy.40
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Table 1
Monthly transfers for school attendance
under the PROGRESA program
School Level Grade Monthly Payment in Pesos
Females Males




Secondary 1 210 200
2 235 210
3 255 225
Source: Schultz (1999a, Table 1).  Corresponds to first term of the 1998-99 school
year.
Table 2




Wife’s age in 1997 30.5 8.1
Husband’s age in 1997 34.4 9.5
Wife’s age at marriage 18.1 3.4
Number of children ever born (1997 ) 3.01 1.92
Number of children ever born (1998) 3.06 1.84
Number of children ever born to
   women age 35-49 (1997)
4.05 2.14
Highest grade completed of children age 7-11 2.39 1.41
Highest grade completed of children aged 12-15 5.79 1.76
Highest grade completed of children age 16 or older
        All
        Boys







Percentage with secondary school in  Village 26.7
Distance to secondary school if not in Village (km) 2.82 1.60
Distance to city (km) 136 74
Parent’s income (pesos) 11,841 12,551
Percentage of children aged
   12-15 who worked for pay
8.4 -
Market income of working













boys girls boys girls boys girls boys girls
6 91.0 94.9 92.9 95.7 - - 7.1 4.3
7 97.8 97.4 98.9 97.8 - - 1.1 2.2
8 97.5 97.3 98.6 99.2 - - 1.4 0.8
9 99.6 98.4 99.6 99.2 - - 0.4 0.8
10 97.2 97.9 97.6 98.7 - - 2.4 1.2
11 97.7 95.9 98.6 96.9 - - 1.4 3.1
12 89.2 89.3 88.7 90.0 2.5 1.1 8.8 8.9
13 78.1 67.5 78.1 70.9 8.6 4.0 13.4 25.2
14 66.9 58.8 67.3 60.4 16.1 10.1 16.7 29.5
15 48.7 38.5 47.7 40.2 27.5 15.6 24.8 44.3
a.  Control and treatment groups in 1997
Table 4
Distribution of highest grade completed


















a. Control and treatment group in 199744
Table 5
Distribution of the durations from marriage












1 52.4 - -
2 18.5 10.6 -
3 9.7 24.5 1.7
4 4.6 18.6 8.9
5 3.4 11.9 16.0
6 2.5 8.3 15.4
7 1.5 6.4 12.4
8 1.4 4.2 10.1
9 1.3 3.3 8.0
10 1.1 2.2 6.6
11 0.8 1.8 4.5
12+ 2.7 8.2 16.5
a.  Control and treatment groups in 1997
Table 6
One period transition rates by sex: age(a) 13 to 15
Boys
Home (a) Work (a) School (a)
Home (a-1) 44.4 40.7 14.8
Work (a-1) 25.0 62.5 12.5
School (a-1) 8.3 5.5 86.2
Girls
Home (a) Work (a) School (a)
Home (a-1) 92.5 7.5 0.0
Work (a-1) 40.0 20.0 20.0
School (a-1) 21.5 1.5 76.945
Table 7
Predicted Selected Characteristics by Unobserved Type
T y p e  1T y p e  2T y p e  3
G i r l sB o y sG i r l sB o y sG i r l sB o y s
% of children age 6-11 in school 98.5 99.4 97.6 99.9 78.7 64.2
% of children age 12-15 in school 37.3 50.2 84.6 86.9 44.5 36.8
% of children age 12-15 at home 55.9 31.0 11.3 7.0 33.5 30.9
% of children age 12-15 at work 6.8 18.8 4.1 6.1 21.9 32.3
Mean wage of children  age12-15 2675 3599 2599 3499 2738 3665
Mean parental income 9916 11927 10124
Percent becoming pregnant 15.3 5.7 15.0
Percent of Sample 36.0 55.9 8.1
Table 8
Actual and Predicted Choice Distribution
by Child Age and Sex
Boys
          Actual               Predicted
Age School Work Home School Work Home c
2
6 0.934 - 0.067 0.923 - 0.077 0.58
7 0.982 - 0.019 0.980 - 0.020 0.02
8 0.987 - 0.013 0.980 - 0.020 0.99
9 0.994 - 0.006 0.980 - 0.020 3.49
10 0.982 - 0.018 0.974 - 0.026 0.86
11 0.977 - 0.023 0.964 - 0.036 1.45
12 0.885 0.021 0.094 0.846 0.039 0.115 3.99
13 0.780 0.084 0.136 0.736 0.078 0.186 4.51
14 0.677 0.157 0.166 0.619 0.191 0.190 3.41
15 0.490 0.276 0.235 0.521 0.251 0.229 0.88
Girls
6 0.965 - 0.035 0.942 - 0.058 3.84
7 0.976 - 0.024 0.968 - 0.032 0.77
8 0.987 - 0.013 0.976 - 0.024 1.96
9 0.991 - 0.009 0.976 - 0.024 3.26
10 0.979 - 0.021 0.970 - 0.030 0.93
11 0.969 - 0.031 0.948 - 0.052 2.97
12 0.896 0.007 0.097 0.854 0.020 0.126 4.61
13 0.723 0.028 0.245 0.676 0.025 0.299 2.85
14 0.582 0.089 0.329 0.566 0.092 0.342 0.22
15 0.419 0.123 0.458 0.402 0.157 0.442 1.68




Actual and Predicted School Attendance Rates by Number of Years
Lagging Behind in School: Age 13-15
Boys Girls




Not behind 88.3 82.1 8.50 83.8 78.2 6.02
Behind one year 79.8 76.4 1.56 75.4 74.5 0.09
Behind two years 65.8 62.5 0.91 52.9 51.0 0.20
Behind three years
         or more
49.1 51.7 0.62 44.7 42.7 0.39
       c
2(.05,1)=3.84   
Table 10
Actual and Predicted Annual Wage if working by Child Age and Sex
a
(number of observations in parentheses)
Boys Girls
Age Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
12 6233 (6) 9298 3720 (2) 7301
13   7064 (21)   7618 5460 (6) 6907
14   7643 (34) 10218   8726 (19) 9306
15 10189 (53) 10313   6386 (22) 9848
a.   in real 1997 pesos47
Table 11
Actual and Predicted School Attendance Rates by Child
Age, Sex and School Attainment: Control and Treatment Groups by Year
a
Girls Boys
Control Group Treatment Group Control Group Treatment Group
1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998
Age 6-11
   Actual 96.9 96.5 97.6 98.5
b 96.6 96.7 97.6 98.7
b
   Predicted 96.1 96.2 96.4 97.1 96.4 96.4 96.3 97.1
   No. obs. 449 431 632 600 471 460 671 678
Age 12-15
   Actual 65.3 66.5 62.9   74.4
b,c,d 68.8 72.5 69.5 76.3
c
   Predicted 61.6 61.8 61.8 74.9 68.8 68.8 68.0 77.1
   No. obs. 190 176 205 223 189 182 279 262
Age 12-15, Behind in School
   Actual 58.3 58.7 56.9   71.4
b,c,d 64.0 67.4 64.2 71.6
c
   Predicted 54.2 55.5 55.6 72.3 63.9 65.3 62.7 72.9
   No. obs. 127 121 144 161 139 135 204 190
Age 13-15, HGC³6
Behind in School
   Actual 40.9 44.4 30.3   51.5
c,d 59.0 57.1 52.6 58.3
   Predicted 40.2 45.3 37.3 58.7 55.0 53.0 51.7 66.7
   N o .  o b s . 6 67 26 66 66 15 69 59 6
a.  based on 200 simulation draws per family
b.  cross-section treatment effect (T98-C98) p-value £ .10
c.  longitudinal treatment effect (T98-T97) p-value £ .10
d.  difference-in-difference treatment effect ((T98-T97) – (C98-C97)) p-value £ .1048
Table 12
Actual verses Predicted Subsidy Effects on Percent Attending School

























97 Control 65.3 72.7 7.4 58.3 67.0 8.7 40.9 58.6 17.7
98 Control 66.5 72.9 6.4 58.7 66.9 8.2 44.4 60.6 16.2





             7.9*, 11.5*, 10.3*           12.7*, 14.1*, 14.5*                7.1, 21.2*, 17.7*
Boys, Age 12-15 Boys, Age 12-15, Behind in school Boys, Age 13-15, HGC³6,
Behind in school
(1) (2) (2)-(1) (1) (2) (2)-(1) (1) (2) (2)-(1)
97 Control 68.8 79.6 10.8 64.0 75.8 11.8 59.0 72.7 13.7
98 Control 72.5 80.2 7.7 67.4 78.0 10.6 57.1 72.8 15.7





               3.8, 6.8*, 3.1                 4.2, 7.4*, 4.0                0.8, 5.7, 2.7
* p-value of treatment effects £ .1049
Table 13
Actual and Predicted Choice Distribution by Child
Age, Sex and School Attainment: Post-Subsidy Treatment
Girls Boys
In School Home Work In School Home Work
Act
a Pred
b Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred.
Age 12-15
c,d
   All 74.4 74.9 21.2 22.3 4.1 2.8 76.3 77.1 14.9 15.0 8.8 7.9
     Not Behind 82.3 82.1 14.5 14.8 3.2 3.1 88.9 88.2 9.7 9.7 1.4 2.1
     Behind 71.9 72.3 23.7 25.0 4.4 2.7 71.6 72.9 16.8 16.9 11.6 10.2
     Not Behind and 52.3 58.7 41.5 37.7 6.2 3.6 58.3 66.7 25.0 20.9 16.7 12.4
        HGC ³ 6
a.  Based on observations in which neither the school nor work choice is missing.
b.  Based in all observations including those missing school or work.
c.  Numbers of observations for each of the four rows are 222, 62, 160 and 65 for girls, and 262, 72, 190 and 96 for boys.
d.  Based on 200 simulation draws per family.50
Table 14
Comparison of Actual and Predicted Attendance and Fertility
Based on N-Year Predictions Using Initial Conditions
Controls,  1997 Controls, 1998 Treatments, 1997
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
Percent Attending School
       Age 6-11
               Girls 96.9 95.3 96.5 95.4 97.6 95.3
               Boys 96.6 93.3 96.7 93.5 97.6 93.2
     Age 12-15
               Girls 65.3 58.2 66.5 58.5 62.9 56.6
               Boys 68.8 62.5 72.5 62.7 69.5 61.2
     Age 12-15, Behind in School
               Girls 58.3 52.4 58.7 52.6 56.9 51.1
               Boys 64.0 56.4 67.4 56.8 64.2 55.2
     Age 12-15, HGC³6, Behind
         in School
               Girls 40.9 41.3 44.0 41.0 30.3 39.6
               Boys 59.0 51.1 57.1 50.1 52.6 48.9
Percent Pregnant
     Age 20-24 17.9 21.2 17.0 19.6 17.3 20.8
     Age 25-29 16.7 20.0 14.6 19.4 16.4 19.8
     Age 30-34 13.1 10.8 9.3 10.8 12.8 11.0
     Age 35+ 5.2 7.8 6.7 8.1 6.3 7.7
Table 15
Short-run and Long-run Effects of the Subsidy on the
Percent of 12-15 Year-olds Attending School
Girls Boys





1997 10.9 11.9 10.7 12.0
1998 11.2 12.3 11.4 12.7
Treatment Group
1997 11.2 12.3 11.3 12.4
1998 11.7 12.7 12.1 12.4
a.  predicted value with subsidy minus predicted value without subsidy, conditional on current
state space
b.   predicted value with subsidy minus predicted value without subsidy, based on initial
conditions51
Table 16
Predicted Effect of the Subsidy on Completed Schooling of Children by Age 16:
All Children Ever Born
a
Girls Boys
No Subsidy Subsidy No Subsidy Subsidy
Mean Schooling 6.29 6.83 6.42 6.96
Percent Completing 75.8 82.2 78.8 83.3
     Grade Six or More
Percent Completing 19.8 25.8 22.8 28.1
     Grade Nine or More
   a. completed schooling at grade 10
Table 17
Predicted Effect of Subsidy on Completed Fertility:





Mean Number of Children Ever Born 4.24 4.28
Percent of Families with
           Zero Children 0.05 0.04
           One Child 1.16 1.13
           Two Children 9.23 8.74
           Three Children 22.97 22.48
           Four Children 24.43 24.60
           Five Children 21.54 21.46
           Six Children 14.78 15.30
           Seven Children 5.05 5.3652
Table 18

















    Girls 6.29 8.37 6.83 7.30 6.56 6.67 6.97
    Boys 6.42 8.29 6.96 7.44 6.68 6.79 7.07
Percent Completed Grade 6 or more
   Girls 75.8 95.1 82.3 86.9 79.3 77.4 82.0
   Boys 78.8 93.7 83.3 86.7 81.1 79.6 82.8
Percent Completed Grade 9 or more
   Girls 19.2 55.5 25.8 31.6 23.1 26.2 29.3
   Boys 22.8 54.7 28.0 34.6 25.5 29.2 31.8
Cost per Family 0 - 26,096 59,956 12,318 15,691 25,193
Mean Number of Children 4.24 4.21 4.28 4.32 4.27 4.25 4.27
a.  Predicted: control and treatment families.
b.  Subsidy for attending school in grades 6-9 only.53
Table 18 continued

















    Girls 6.50 6.39 6.41 6.30 6.75
    Boys 6.58 6.55 6.53 6.52 6.79
Percent Completed Grade 6 or more
   Girls 74.9 76.0 77.6 76.1 81.5
   Boys 76.9 79.0 80.0 79.9 81.8
Percent Completed Grade 9 or more
   Girls 28.8 21.2 20.8 19.7 25.3
   Boys 32.7 24.1 23.6 23.5 26.5
Cost per Family 36,996 - 237,000 - 25,262
Mean Number Children 4.20 4.25 4.23 4.25 4.29
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1. Couples married seven years or less at 1997 survey date.
2. Couples married eight years of more at 1997 survey date.Table A.1








CRRA parameter:  l00 0.8715
(0.0196)
Number of boys age 12-15, with
6 years of school and currently
attending school: l16    -78.78
(242.13)





















Number of girls age 12-15, with
6 years of school and currently
attending school: l17     63.97
(272.88)






















Number of children age 12-15























of children net of
current birth : l01 -0.001404
(0.01818)
Number of Children age 12-15,









   15.99
(241.16)














Number of Children age 12-15,
behind 2 years in school and
currently attending school: l20   -32.08
(171.88)
Number of girls age 14-15 at
home ´ Number of children age
0-5: l41  287.46
(571.33)
Number of children age
12-15 at home ´
Consumption: l03 -0.110051
(0.02295)
Number of Children age 12-15,
behind 3+ years in school and
currently attending school: l21   -10.80
(183.88)
Number of girls age 12-15 at
home ´ Number of children age
0-5: l42      3.27
(422.86)











Number of Boys age 12-15
currently attending school and







    32.16
(194.54)




Number of children attending a
secondary school x Distance














Number of children age 12-15






















Number of children age
0-2: l5 473.87
(1387.75)
Number of Boys currently at











Number of boys attending grade
10: l45  673.82
(311.36)
A.5Table A.1, continued
Parameterizations and Parameter Estimates







Number of children age
0-2 squared : l6 -811.75
(544.91)

































Shock to preferences for boys
age 12 –15 at home x number of
boys at home age




























Shock to preferences for girls
age 12 –15 at home x number of
girls at home age
  6-11: l49
12-13: l50





First yr. of marriage: l9
Age 20-24: l19
        25-29: l11
        30-34: l12
        35-39: l13
























in previous period : l15 -37001.59
(1442.54)










(a)  the discount rate d is set equal to 0.95
A.6Table A.1, continued
Parameterizations and Parameter Estimates
II. Parents Earnings Function, Child Earnings Function, and Failure Probability Function
II. Parent Income Function III. Child Income Function IV. School Failure Probability Function











    8.86943
(0.09523)
    9.06828
(0.09424)






    6.98440
(0.19946)
    6.92017
(0.206614)






   -2.21386
(0.27721)
   -2.77271
(0.278188)
   -1.25098
(0.35503)
Husband’s age : :g
p
1     0.02034
(0.00487622)










    0.0005055
(0.00012301)
Distance of village to
nearest city:go2
   -0.0001329
(0.0005342)
Child age:p2     0.09557
(0.039131)




   -0.0018124
(0.00013122)
Child’s age: go3      0.02811
(0.0026638)
Child is a boy:p3     0.11942
(0.08678)
Child is aged 14-15: go4      0.52091
(0.175615)
Child is age 8-15 and
has zero years of
schooling:p4
    1.62278
(0.255226)
Child is a boy´
Child is aged 14-15: go5
    -0.05345
(0.202948)




   -0.14309
(1.49843)
    0.74041
(0.24014)
   -0.67016
(1.25187)
Child is aged 15: go6       0.12469
(0.168712)
Child’s grade >= 7 and
child is a boy:p6    -0.52010
(0.283648)
Child is a boy´
Child is aged 15: go7
    -0.08053
(0.205024)
A.7Table A.1, continued
Parameterizations and Parameter Estimates
V. Type Probabilities:
Couples married 8 years or more
VI. Type Probabilities:
Couples married 7 years or less
VII. Variance-Covariance Matrix
f(e)=N(0,W)








   2.5289
(1.7435)





















   2.0681
(10.0052)














   -0.04049
(0.072084)
    0.04235
(0.059344)
Number of kids










































3 or more children
age 0-5, or 3 or
more age 6-11, or








    0.12185
(0.46245)










   0.0142
(0.2344)















   0.000387
(0.00276)
   0.001824
(0.00269)
Average schooling



















































































   1.06700
(2.2920)
Child wage
measurement error
std. deviation
0.5402055
(0.05363)
Number of kids
14-15
Type 1:b
2
6,1
Type 2:b
2
6,2
  -0.00410
(0.5312)
  -0.15981
(0.5262)
Number of
children
12-15
Type 1:b
2
7,1
Type 2:b
2
7,2
  -0.13983
(0.3975)
  -0.31883
(0.3990)
Number of
children as of
1997
Type 1:b
2
8,1
Type 2:b
2
8,2
  0.103014
(0.15726)
 -0.349685
(0.13455)
A.8